SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN ALLEMAGNE
\n1. La R\u00e9publique F\u00e9d\u00e9rale Allemande se comprend comme un \u00e9tat de droit d\u00e9mocratique et
\nsocial (Art. 20 de la constitution, Grundgesetz (GG), Loi Fondamentale). L\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la justice,
\naux juges, auxquels le pouvoir de rendre la justice est confi\u00e9e (Art. 92), est garanti par la
\nconstitution (Art. 19 alin\u00e9a 4). La Cour Constitutionnelle puissante est souvent l\u2019arbitre entre
\nles autres pouvoirs, l\u2019ex\u00e9cutif et le l\u00e9gislatif, soit, sur recours constitutionnel individuel soit
\nsur recours introduit par un magistrat en vue d\u2019un contr\u00f4le de constitutionnalit\u00e9, entre le
\ncitoyen et \u00abl\u2019\u00e9tat\u00bb.
\n2. La justice est, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, dans le domaine des L\u00e4nder (=les \u00e9tats qui forment la f\u00e9d\u00e9ration),
\nseules les Cours Supr\u00eames et la Cour Constitutionnelle F\u00e9d\u00e9rale sont des cours f\u00e9d\u00e9rales. La
\nl\u00e9gislation sur la justice et son organisation ainsi que \u2013 en principe \u2013 le statut des magistrats
\nsont aussi du ressort de la f\u00e9d\u00e9ration, seule la r\u00e9mun\u00e9ration est en partie, en vertu d\u2019une loi
\nf\u00e9d\u00e9rale, entre les mains des L\u00e4nder en ce qui concerne les d\u00e9tails (voir infra sub 7.)
\n3. Les juges et les magistrats du parquet ont, en principe, un statut assez confortable et ils
\ngardent leurs droits de citoyen (conception du juge-citoyen), y compris le droit d\u2019\u00eatre
\nmembre actif d\u2019un parti politique et\/ou d\u2019un syndicat. Les magistrats du parquet ont \u2013h\u00e9las \u2013
\nle statut de fonctionnaires et le parquet est fortement hi\u00e9rarchis\u00e9.
\n4. En ce qui concerne les organisations professionnelles de magistrats, il en existe trois: La
\ntraditionnelle Association Allemande de Magistrats (Deutscher Richterbund, DRiB, largement
\nmajoritaire) et les deux groupes progressistes, membres de MEDEL: Les Magistrats ver.di
\n(Syndicat Unifi\u00e9 des Services Publics et Priv\u00e9s,)Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaf) et la
\nNouvelle Association des Magistrats (Neue Richtervereinigung, NRV).
\n5. Pour l\u2019administration et la gestion de l\u2019institution judiciaire, il n\u2019existe pas d\u2019organe du type
\nCSM (conseil Sup\u00e9rieur de la Magistrature) comme dans le reste de l\u2019Europe, ni au niveau de
\nla f\u00e9d\u00e9ration ni des L\u00e4nder. On peut donc parler d\u2019une s\u00e9paration des pouvoirs de l\u2019\u00e9tat
\ninachev\u00e9e. La cr\u00e9ation de tels organes est donc revendiqu\u00e9e par les trois organisations de
\nmagistrats, mais elle n\u2019est ni s\u00e9rieusement discut\u00e9e ni revendiqu\u00e9e dans et par le politique
\n(des exceptions existent toutefois). Un certain espoir s\u2019est fait jour : Le bureau et la
\npr\u00e9sidence de notre Syndicat ver.di, avec ses deux millions de membres, soutiennent notre
\nrevendication d\u2019une administration et d\u2019une gestion du syst\u00e8me judiciaire ind\u00e9pendantes
\n(autonomes).
\n6. Bien qu\u2019il manque un syst\u00e8me de ce type, existent in nuce des \u00e9l\u00e9ments d\u2019autonomie et\/ou
\nprot\u00e9geant l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance des magistrats :
\n– L\u2019autogestion des cours et tribunaux par un organisme (le Pr\u00e4sidium) \u00e9lu par les juges
\nqui fixe la composition des chambres et la distribution des affaires selon des crit\u00e8res
\nabstraits-g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, pour garantir le juge naturel et \u00e9viter toute manipulation ;
\n– La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d\u2019un avis des repr\u00e9sentants \u00e9lus des magistrats \u00e0 chaque acte
\nadministratif \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9rieur du tribunal qui concerne les juges (la Mitbestimmung,
\ncogestion). Le degr\u00e9 de Mitbestimmung oscille selon les diff\u00e9rents L\u00e4nder entre l\u2019avis
\nsimple et l\u2019avis conforme ;
\n– La discipline est confi\u00e9e, pour les magistrats (sauf l\u2019avertissement qui est de la
\ncomp\u00e9tence du pr\u00e9sident) \u00e0 des tribunaux ind\u00e9pendants compos\u00e9s de juges (selon la
\nl\u00e9gislation de quelques L\u00e4nder, compl\u00e9t\u00e9s par un avocat) ; la discipline est, d\u2019ailleurs,
\nappliqu\u00e9e tr\u00e8s restrictivement si l\u2019on compare la pratique avec d\u2019autres pays;.
\n– Pour les Cours F\u00e9d\u00e9rales, et dans une grande partie des L\u00e4nder, les juges ne sont pas
\nchoisis et nomm\u00e9s par le seul ministre de la justice mais en commun avec une
\ncommission parlementaire (et donc pluraliste). Ce syst\u00e8me a \u00e9t\u00e9, apr\u00e8s la chute du
\nsyst\u00e8me d\u2019injustice nazi avec sa politisation de la justice, y compris sa partialit\u00e9, cr\u00e9\u00e9 et
\nchoisi pour garantir une composition pluraliste de la justice qui correspond \u00e0 la
\npluralit\u00e9 sociale et repr\u00e9sente celle-ci.
\n7. Pour conclure, trois touches sur des probl\u00e8mes actuels, outre la lutte pour un syst\u00e8me CSM
\nd\u2019autogestion et, par cela, l\u2019ach\u00e8vement de la s\u00e9paration des pouvoirs :
\n– La r\u00e9forme du syst\u00e8me PeBB\u00a7y (Personalbedarfsberechnungssystem, syst\u00e8me
\nd\u2019\u00e9valuation des charges de travail servant de base \u00e0 la fixation des chiffres de dossiers
\nconsid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme devant \u00eatre trait\u00e9es par le personnel dans le budget de la justice et
\nfavorisant une r\u00e9partition des charges \u00e9gale et juste au sein des cours et tribunaux);
\n– La mis\u00e8re des salaires d\u2019une grande partie des magistrats (surtout les juges de base et
\nparmi eux surtout les jeunes) : La Cour Constitutionnelle vient de d\u00e9clarer le syst\u00e8me,
\ndans plusieurs L\u00e4nder, incompatible avec la constitution qui garantit pour les magistrats
\nune r\u00e9mun\u00e9ration ad\u00e9quate \u00e0 la fonction de juge et\/ou de membre du parquet
\n(jugement du 5 mai 2015 -!-);
\n– La menace que repr\u00e9senteraient des accords comme TTIP etc\u2026 pour un \u00e9tat de droit
\nd\u00e9mocratique qui pourraient remplacer les comp\u00e9tences des justices nationales
\nind\u00e9pendantes par un syst\u00e8me d\u2019arbitrage aux crit\u00e8res et avec le personnel du capital
\ninternational.
\nSITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN BELGIQUE : EXSANGUE ET OUTRAGEE
\n1. La justice belge est exsangue car les gouvernements qui se sont succ\u00e9d\u00e9s depuis plus de dix ans
\nont oeuvr\u00e9 au d\u00e9sengagement de l\u2019Etat dans ce domaine qui rel\u00e8ve pourtant \u00e0 la fois d\u2019un service
\npublic mais \u00e9galement et surtout d\u2019un pouvoir constitu\u00e9.
\nDans le rapport qu\u2019elle a rendu public en 2014, la CEPEJ a \u00e9valu\u00e9 pour 2012 \u00e0 0,7% la part du budget
\nnational consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 la justice alors que la moyenne europ\u00e9enne est de 2,2%. La Belgique se situait
\nainsi en avant-derni\u00e8re position.
\nEn 2014 et 2015, le gouvernement a impos\u00e9 au secteur de nouvelles mesures d\u2019aust\u00e9rit\u00e9 qui vont
\nn\u00e9cessairement aggraver son \u00e9tat de faillite. Exemples : dans les 4 prochaines ann\u00e9es, sur 6
\nmagistrats qui partent, un seul sera remplac\u00e9 ; de nombreux palais sont insalubres ; l\u2019informatique
\nest pr\u00e9historique et d\u00e9fectueuse ; de nombreux greffes connaissent des p\u00e9riodes de fermeture
\nr\u00e9guli\u00e8re par manque de personnel ; le minist\u00e8re public a renonc\u00e9 \u00e0 poursuivre toute une s\u00e9rie
\nd\u2019infractions ; un arri\u00e9r\u00e9 de plus de 100 millions d\u2019euros \u00e9tait d\u00fb \u00e0 la fin 2014 aux experts et
\ntraducteurs\u2026
\nLa justice belge est donc plac\u00e9e dans l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 mat\u00e9rielle d\u2019exercer bon nombre de ses missions.
\n2. L\u2019\u00e9quilibre des institutions a r\u00e9cemment \u00e9t\u00e9 rompu par le l\u00e9gislateur en sorte que la justice va
\n\u00e9galement \u00eatre plac\u00e9e dans l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 d\u2019exercer son r\u00f4le de pouvoir constitu\u00e9, contre-pouvoir
\ndes pouvoirs l\u00e9gislatif et ex\u00e9cutif.
\nCette rupture d\u2019\u00e9quilibre est le r\u00e9sultat de deux lois r\u00e9centes :
\n– la loi du 1er d\u00e9cembre 2013 qui impose pour des raisons budg\u00e9taires aux magistrats d\u2019\u00eatre \u00ab
\nmobiles \u00bb au sein d\u2019un espace \u00e9largi, parfois tr\u00e8s vaste, et permet donc de les \u00ab d\u00e9placer \u00bb, au m\u00e9pris
\nde la Constitution qui garantit leur ind\u00e9pendance par leur inamovibilit\u00e9 ;
\n– la loi du 18 f\u00e9vrier 2014 qui pr\u00e9tend introduire la \u00ab gestion autonome \u00bb des entit\u00e9s judiciaires et qui
\na fait de la justice un d\u00e9partement minist\u00e9riel. Les moyens – c\u2019est \u00e0 dire une enveloppe ferm\u00e9e
\nr\u00e9duite comme on le devine \u00e0 peau de chagrin \u2013 seront d\u00e9sormais allou\u00e9s par le ministre de la justice
\naux entit\u00e9s judiciaires, plac\u00e9es en concurrence, apr\u00e8s \u00e9valuation de leurs \u00ab r\u00e9sultats \u00bb et de leur
\nproduction, suivant des crit\u00e8res et des objectifs qui seront d\u00e9finis par le ministre lequel a d\u00e9j\u00e0 pr\u00e9vu
\nl\u2019obligation de traiter dans un d\u00e9lai d\u2019un an tous les dossiers entrants dans une structure. La mise
\nsous tutelle est donc \u00e9vidente et lorsqu\u2019elle est conjugu\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019absence de moyens, l\u2019on aper\u00e7oit
\nl\u2019ampleur du coup qui est port\u00e9 \u00e0 la d\u00e9mocratie belge.
\nC\u2019est pour ces raisons que les magistrats belges ont lanc\u00e9 deux recours contre ces lois aupr\u00e8s de la
\nCour constitutionnelle et qu\u2019ils vont introduire aupr\u00e8s de la Commission europ\u00e9enne une plainte
\nfond\u00e9e sur l\u2019article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux.
\nC\u2019est dans ce contexte \u00e9galement qu\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 organis\u00e9e le 20 mars dernier une journ\u00e9e d\u2019alerte qui a
\nr\u00e9uni l\u2019ensemble des acteurs du monde judiciaire, avec le Barreau, le personnel, les experts et les
\ntraducteurs.
\nAth\u00e8nes, 23 mai 2015, Vinciane Boon Porte-parole de l\u2019Association syndicale des magistrats et M&M
\nSITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN BULGARIE
\nAccording to the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the judiciary shall be independent
\nfrom the other two branches of the state power. The Supreme Judicial Council \/SJC\/ is entitled to
\nelect, promote, demote, transfer, to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges, prosecutors and
\ninvestigating magistrates and dismiss them from office. The judiciary has an independent budget
\nwhich is administered by the SJC.
\nThe current set up of the Supreme Judicial Council enables strong political influence over the
\nfunctioning of the Council. According to the Constitution, the SJC consist of 25 members. The
\nPresident of the Supreme Court of Cassation, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, and
\nthe Prosecutor General are ex officio members of the Council. Eleven of the members of the SJC are
\nelected by the Parliament and eleven are elected by the judicial authorities which includes courts,
\nprosecutors\u2019 offices and offices of investigating magistrates. The \u2018professional quota\u2019 of the Council
\ncomprises of 6 judges, 4 prosecutors and 1 investigating magistrates.
\nOn several occasions the Bulgarian Judges Association expressed concern that the structure of the
\nSJC opens a wide range of possibilities for political interference in the process of administration of
\nthe judiciary, especially in elections of the presidents of courts and appointments of the Prosecutor
\nGeneral and the presidents of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative
\nCourt. The current structure of the Council and the number of its \u2018Parliament quota\u2019 members
\nenables politization of the process of appointing the candidates nominated by the parliamentary
\nrepresented political parties1.
\nAnother issue arising from the existing structure of the SJC is bringing together powers relating to
\njudges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates into a single body \u2013 all functions of the Council
\nregarding these three types of magistrates are executed by the plenary of the SJC. In a series of
\nopinions and recommendations the institutions of the Council of Europe consistently highlight that
\n1 Opinion CDL-INF (99) 5 of 22-23 March 1999; Opinion of 5-6 July 2002 (CDL-AD (2002) 15);
\nOpinions Nos 444\/2007 and 515\/2009 of the European Commission for Democracy through Law \/The Venice
\nCommission\/.
\none of the major instruments that guarantee judicial independence and the effective management of
\nthe judiciary is creating safeguards, which ensure that matters relating to the status of judges and
\nprosecutors will be addressed independently.2 The Venice Commission and the Parliamentary
\nAssembly of the Council recommended reconsideration of the common administration of the affairs
\nof judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates.3
\nThe Bulgarian Judges Association has addressed these problems and has drawn up several proposals
\nfor amendments of the Judicial System Act aiming at institutional accordance of the administration of
\nBulgarian judiciary with best European practices. There are some reasons for optimism as the
\npresent Government and especially the Minister of Justice in the beginning of this year announced a
\nplan for judicial reform that includes a draft for a Constitutional amendment in conformity with the
\nabovementioned recommendations.
\nThe political influence over the SJC hinders the fulfillment of one of its basic duties \u2013 to protect
\njudicial independence. In Bulgaria judges operate in an environment, which makes their work
\nstrongly dependent on public opinion formed to a large extent by the arbitrary public comments on
\nthe work of courts by representatives of the executive power. This places the discretion of judges in
\nrelation to their professional duties, under disconcerting pressure and compromises the principle of
\nfair adjudication on the basis of the law and collected evidence only.
\nThe Bulgarian Judges Association appealed several times to the SJC and insisted that the Council is
\nthe body that is bound to protect the independence of the judiciary and to assure an efficient, fair
\nand transparent judicial administration. Unfortunately, the majority of the Council\u2019s members fail to
\nunderstand the importance of the issues we raise and our organization is criticised by them for too
\nmuch \u2018activism\u2019.
\nThere were two recent significant examples of undue and vague practices of the SJS. Judge Nelli
\nKutzkova, the former Spokesperson and ex-member of the Board of the Bulgarian Judges Association,
\nwas the only candidate for the position of the President of the Sofia Appellate Court. Her candidature
\nwas supported by 40 of 58 judges at that court. During the session of the Council held on 30 April
\n2015, before the election, 11 members of the SJC spoke in favor of her nomination saying that she is
\nthe proper candidate. No one of the Council\u2019s members did express a negative opinion. As a result of
\nthe secret voting only 9 members of the Council voted for judge Kutzkova, 4 members voted against
\nher and other 6 abstained. After the voting one of the Council\u2019s members declared that he voted
\nagainst judge Kutzkova as she was \u2018politically affined\u2019 and once elected she would contribute to
\ndisunion within the professional community.
\nDuring the same session of the SJC another scandalous decision was made. An agenda item was the
\napproval of the status of irremovability4 of judge Krasimir Mazgalov, member of the Bulgarian Judges
\nAssociation and one of the 24 judges from the Sofia City Court who some weeks ago criticized the
\n2 Opinion no.10 (2007) and Opinion no.12 (2009) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE)
\n3 Opinion No 515\/2009 of the Venice Commission; Resolution No 1730 (2010) of the Parliamentary
\nAssembly of the Council of Europe
\n4 After completing the fifth year of service and upon attestation by the SJC\u2019s Nomination and Attestation
\nCommission, affirmed by the SJC\u2019s resolution, a judge is appointed indefinitely and acquires life tenure.
\nCouncil for its inactivity to identify and condemn some dubious practices of the administration of
\nthat court. The judge Mazgalov\u2019s performance evaluation was excellent and no one member of the
\nCouncil expressed a negative opinion. However as a result of the secret voting there were not
\nprevailing votes for his irremovabality which was equivalent to his removal from the office. That was
\naverted only because of the reaction of two of the SJC members who proposed a new voting during
\nwhich the proposal for his irremovability was approved with a very slight majority.
\nAtanas Atanasov, Judge of Sofia City Court, Member of the Board of the Bulgarian Judges Association
\nSITUATION DE LA JUSTICE A CHYPRE
\nIn regard of the problems of the Judges in Cyprus I would like to inform you the following:
\nAs you may know Cyprus had a very strong and wealthy economy before 2013. The development of
\nthe Cyprus economy was one of the best in Europe.
\nAfter continuous strategic mistakes of Cyprus banks and the decision of bail in to Cyprus banks in
\nMarch 2013, the whole country faced an incredible economic crisis.
\nTrying to save the economy of total collapse, Cyprus government made an application for assistance
\nto the E.U and the International Monetary Fund.
\nOne of the first demands of the representatives of troika was the salary\u2019s reduction of the public
\nservants in a percentage of 20%. .
\nAlthough there is a strict prohibition in the Constitution of Cyprus which does not allow the reduction
\nof judge\u2019s salary and other benefits, the parliament decided to include the members of the judiciary
\nto the reduction Law.
\nWe have cautioned the government and the parliament about the infringement of the Constitution
\nbut with no result. After that all members of our association filed an application to the Supreme
\nCourt of Cyprus against the law of the parliament.
\nThe Supreme Court found unconstitutional the reduction of the judge\u2019s salary and cancelled the law.
\nBut all this period the members of the judiciary were facing an unbelievable attack from politicians
\nand the media. They were accusing us of been indifferent to the problems of the economy. But for
\nour association this was not a matter of money but a matter of a clear violence of the Constitution.
\nProving that, after the judgement of the Supreme Court who cancelled the law, all members of our
\nassociation offered voluntary 20% of their salary. The government accepted that offer. We do not
\nbelieve of course that the economic crisis will be solved with our offer but we thought that this will
\nbe a symbolic action for the people of Cyprus who suffers from the measures taken by the troika.
\nIf we add also another 15% of new income taxes after March 2013 the whole reduction of judge\u2019s
\nsalary amounts approximately to 35%. Of course we have warned the government that any other
\nreduction is not acceptable because it will affect the decent living and the integrity of the members
\nof the judiciary.
\nEconomic crisis does not affect only the salary of the judges. Also affected the whole society and the
\npeople of Cyprus began to doubt the system including the judiciary. The media are criticizing the
\njudgments of the Courts in many cases unfairly and in most cases without even reading the
\njudgement.
\nAlso the number of cases coming in to the courts increased dramatically due to the economic crisis.
\nThe judges doing their best to manage the increasing work. But because of the embargo of new
\nemployments the problem remains.
\nOf course we must not forget the infringement of human rights in Cyprus by the Turkish army who
\noccupies approximately 40% of the island since 1974.
\nUnder these circumstances Cyprus judges keep their independence and continue to serve the rule of
\nlaw and democracy.
\nSITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN ESPAGNE
\nSince 2012, the Spanish government has been introducing reforms that, taken collectively, would
\nseriously weaken the rule of law.
\nA Court Fees Act and an initial reform to the Organic Law of the Judiciary were passed in 2012; a law
\nto reform the Judicial Council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) was passed in 2013; and reforms
\nto the Criminal Code and the Citizen Security and Public Safety Act have been passed in March 2015.
\nProposed reforms to the Legal Aid Act, the Criminal Procedure Act and additional reforms of the
\nOrganic Law of the Judiciary are still under discussion in parliament.
\nWe are deeply concerned that these legislative reforms adversely affect the proper functioning of
\nthe institutions responsible for safeguarding the rule of law, and attack the following elements of the
\nrule of law: access to justice and independent and effective judicial review; non- discrimination and
\nequality before the law; separation of powers and judicial independence; legal certainty and respect
\nfor human rights; and a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting
\nlaw.
\nThe principles and values are threatened in Spain as a result of legislative reforms, some of which
\nhave been adopted and others which are in the course of being approved, and how domestic rule of
\nlaw safeguards have not been capable of containing such threats.
\nJudges for Democracy, ( JPD) and Progressive Union of Prosecutors, ( UPF) express their grave
\nconcern in relation to serious threats to the rule of law in Spain.
\nThe government should reopen the reforms to proper consultations with the aim of ensuring the
\nreforms lead to an effective reorganization and modernization of the judicial system. Our judiciary
\nshould be organized and resourced in such a way as to secure independence and to ensure the
\njudiciary can secure the rule of law, including an adequate number of judges and prosecutors, proper
\nfacilities and resources, etc. Remind the Spanish government that political and executive interference
\nwith the judiciary is inconsistent with the requirement for an independent judiciary.
\nThe proposed laws infringe the principle of legal certainty and the freedoms of expression and
\nassembly, fundamental rights in a democratic society governed by the rule of law and the new
\nimmigration law legalizes summary returns.
\nJPD UPF
\nSITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN FRANCE
\nL’alternance politique de 2012 n’a pas permis \u00e0 la justice fran\u00e7aise de revenir sur dix ann\u00e9es de
\npopulisme s\u00e9curitaire et de p\u00e9nurie budg\u00e9taire. Faute d’ambition politique, elle n’a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9form\u00e9e
\nen profondeur et reste profond\u00e9ment in\u00e9galitaire et maltraitante pour ses usagers.
\nUne justice dont l’ind\u00e9pendance n’est toujours pas garantie
\nAucune r\u00e9forme constitutionnelle n’est venue renforcer l’ind\u00e9pendance de la justice. Si le pouvoir
\nex\u00e9cutif n’intervient plus dans le cours des affaires individuelles, son emprise reste tr\u00e8s forte sur la
\ncarri\u00e8re des magistrats. Les magistrats du parquet n’ont toujours pas conquis leur ind\u00e9pendance, et
\nde nombreux scandales politico-financiers, mettant en jeu des personnalit\u00e9s politiques de premier
\nplan comme un ancien pr\u00e9sident de la R\u00e9publique, sont un pr\u00e9texte pour alimenter le soup\u00e7on d’une
\njustice instrumentalis\u00e9e. Le syndicalisme judiciaire a \u00e9t\u00e9 la cible de violentes attaques qui laissent
\ncraindre, pour les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir, une remise en cause fondamentale.
\nLes libert\u00e9s individuelles en danger
\nDepuis 1986, la France renforce son arsenal r\u00e9pressif au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme. La
\nderni\u00e8re loi vot\u00e9e restreint le contr\u00f4le du juge judiciaire sur les atteintes aux libert\u00e9s individuelles au
\nprofit de l’administration, notamment en cr\u00e9ant l’interdiction administrative de sortie du territoire
\npour les \u00ab candidats au djihad \u00bb ou en autorisant le blocage de sites internet sur d\u00e9cision
\nadministrative.
\nLa mobilisation nationale pour la libert\u00e9 d’expression qui a suivi les attentats de janvier 2015 a vite
\n\u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9cup\u00e9r\u00e9e par un gouvernement qui a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 la \u00ab guerre \u00bb au terrorisme et justifie toutes les
\nd\u00e9rives s\u00e9curitaires. Le Parlement s’appr\u00eate \u00e0 voter une loi, qui, sous pr\u00e9texte d’encadrer les
\npouvoirs des services de renseignement, autorisera la surveillance de masse des citoyens sans
\ncontr\u00f4le d’une autorit\u00e9 ind\u00e9pendante. Les exigences de fermet\u00e9 et d’exemplarit\u00e9 dans la lutte contre
\nle racisme et le terrorisme conduisent au d\u00e9mant\u00e8lement continu de la loi sur la libert\u00e9 de la presse,
\nqui prot\u00e8ge la libert\u00e9 d’expression. Le d\u00e9lit d’apologie du terrorisme est devenu une infraction de
\ndroit commun, s\u00e9v\u00e8rement r\u00e9prim\u00e9e par les tribunaux, comme le seront bient\u00f4t les injures et
\ndiffamations \u00e0 caract\u00e8re raciste.
\nEn mati\u00e8re p\u00e9nale, le gouvernement a renonc\u00e9 \u00e0 r\u00e9former en profondeur. La loi p\u00e9nale vot\u00e9e en
\n2014 a certes supprim\u00e9 le m\u00e9canisme des peines planchers, et cr\u00e9\u00e9 une nouvelle peine, la probation.
\nMais les parlementaires et le pouvoir ex\u00e9cutif ont pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9 donner des gages de fermet\u00e9 \u00e0 l’opinion
\npublique plut\u00f4t que de mettre en oeuvre une politique r\u00e9ellement progressiste. Et le gouvernement
\na abandonn\u00e9 toute vell\u00e9it\u00e9 de r\u00e9former la justice des mineurs, pourtant saccag\u00e9e par dix ann\u00e9es de
\npolitique s\u00e9curitaire, ou de supprimer la r\u00e9tention de s\u00fbret\u00e9.
\nPour la justice du quotidien, des logiques gestionnaires
\nLe service public de la justice n’a cess\u00e9 de se d\u00e9grader ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es. Pour faire face au flux
\ndes proc\u00e9dures, les juridictions, sous la pression de la hi\u00e9rarchie judiciaire, ont c\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 la logique
\ngestionnaire. Le contradictoire, l’\u00e9coute du justiciable, la coll\u00e9gialit\u00e9 disparaissent des pr\u00e9toires au
\nprofit de proc\u00e9dures exp\u00e9ditives dans lesquelles le juge devient l’alibi d’un parquet tout puissant. Les
\nmissions de protection et de garant des libert\u00e9s du juge sont r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement remises en cause au
\nprofit d’une justice p\u00e9nale qui elle tourne \u00e0 plein r\u00e9gime pour r\u00e9primer, toujours plus s\u00e9v\u00e8rement,
\nles populations les plus faibles.
\nLa justice reste inaccessible pour nombre de justiciables que la crise a pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9 dans la pr\u00e9carit\u00e9, et
\nqui ne peuvent avoir acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un avocat. L’Etat se d\u00e9sengage du budget de l’aide juridictionnelle, un
\ndes plus faibles d’Europe, et refuse d’assurer une r\u00e9mun\u00e9ration d\u00e9cente aux avocats qui se
\nconsacrent \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense des plus d\u00e9munis.
\nFran\u00e7oise Martres Pr\u00e9sidente du Syndicat de la Magistrature.
\nLA SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN GRECE
\nChaque syst\u00e8me judiciaire \u00e9volue dans son propre contexte historique en respectant la Constitution,
\nla culture et la tradition judiciaire nationale
\nLa justice grecque comporte des probl\u00e8mes permanents graves, qui pourraient \u00eatre attribues en
\ngrande partie au manque de modernisation de son mod\u00e8le d\u2019organisation actuel.
\nLes retards dans l\u2019administration et le rendement de la justice sont consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme l’un des
\nprincipaux probl\u00e8mes.
\nLa Gr\u00e8ce occupe une des premi\u00e8res places parmi les pays du Conseil d\u2019 Europe dans lesquels la
\njustice et les litiges sont g\u00e9r\u00e9s \u00e0 des rythmes tr\u00e8s lents.
\nDans notre syst\u00e8me proc\u00e9dural le \u201cfiltrage\u201d des affaires judiciaires n\u2019est pas pr\u00e9vu, ce qui fait que
\npresque un million d\u2019affaires judiciaires sont au jour d\u2019hui pendantes devant les tribunaux grecs.
\nD\u2019autres formes de r\u00e8glement des litiges, comme la m\u00e9diation, ne sont pas encore d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es.
\nLa surcharge de l’appareil judiciaire de la justice grecque n\u2019est pas seulement li\u00e9e \u00e0 la production
\ncontinue et fragmentaire des r\u00e8gles, ce qui engendre un exc\u00e8s de mati\u00e8re judiciaire (une \u00e9norme
\nquantit\u00e9 de mati\u00e8re judiciaire), surtout pour les tribunaux administratifs et p\u00e9naux, mais aussi au fait
\nqu\u2019un certain nombre de graves probl\u00e8mes juridiques apparaissent concernant des citoyens ayant
\ndes croyances, des visions du monde et des religions diff\u00e9rentes \u00e9manant de la cr\u00e9ation de nouvelles
\nparam\u00e8tres culturelles.
\nCompte tenu de l’analyse du sociologue Max Weber \u00e0 propos de la relation entre le droit et
\nl\u2019\u00e9conomie, \u00e0 savoir du lien \u00e9troit entre les institutions et le march\u00e9, on dirait que le syst\u00e8me
\nd\u2019administration de la justice a subi un coup suppl\u00e9mentaire pour une autre raison, notamment \u00e0
\ncause de l’environnement \u00e9conomique cr\u00e9\u00e9 par la crise financi\u00e8re.
\nChoisissant alors une solution facile afin de faire face au co\u00fbt de la justice, l’\u00e9tat a r\u00e9duit des services
\net des d\u00e9penses n\u00e9cessaires pour le fonctionnement du syst\u00e8me, cela ayant comme r\u00e9sultat la
\ncarence apparente non seulement en infrastructure logistique mais aussi en ressources humaines, vu
\nque des postes de magistrats et de greffiers restent vacants.
\nDans le cadre de ces r\u00e9ductions le gouvernement, ayant reproch\u00e9 aux magistrats grecs de former une
\n\u201c\u00e9lite\u201d, un groupe privil\u00e9gi\u00e9, a proc\u00e9d\u00e9 dans une p\u00e9riode de deux ans \u00e0 la diminution de leurs
\nr\u00e9mun\u00e9rations de 60%.
\nLe non-respect de l\u2019ex\u00e9cutif aux d\u00e9cisions judiciaires conduit \u00e0 l’augmentation des pouvoirs de ce
\ndernier, au d\u00e9triment de l’\u00e9tat de droit.
\nDans le corps judiciaire il ya un point de vue qui est tr\u00e8s rependu, selon lequel dans la magistrature
\ngrecque la discipline doit \u00eatre sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle r\u00e9gnant dans l’arm\u00e9e et que c\u2019 est une impi\u00e9t\u00e9 de la
\npart des juges d\u2019 exprimer leurs avis.
\nLa haute hi\u00e9rarchie judiciaire maintenait un certain scepticisme \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard des actes des juges,
\njouissant d’une ind\u00e9pendance r\u00e9elle
\nCe point de vue a \u00e9t\u00e9 une entrave aux efforts d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s par l\u2019Association grecque pour la d\u00e9mocratie
\net la libert\u00e9 tout au long de son existence et ayant pour objectif d\u2019attirer un nombre important de
\nmembres parmi les juges, m\u00eame si elle a r\u00e9ussi a jeter des ponts entre les magistrats desservant les
\ndiff\u00e9rents secteurs de justice, y compris les magistrats retrait\u00e9s, et cela gr\u00e2ce au principe du
\npluralisme sur lequel elle est fond\u00e9e en vertu de ses objectifs statutaires, qui lui permettent de s\u2019
\nexprimer non seulement concernant le cadre \u00e9troit de l’administration et de rendement de la
\njustice, mais aussi sur les questions qui pr\u00e9occupent largement l’opinion publique.
\nEn vue de ces probl\u00e8mes susmentionn\u00e9s, on pourrait pr\u00e9tendre que l\u2019administration de la justice
\ndans des palais de justice aux colonnes grecques ainsi que la rationalisation du syst\u00e8me administratif
\net judiciaire restent pour l’instant un r\u00eave insaisissable pour la magistrature.
\nEvi Palaiologou Presidente de l\u2019association Grecque Ath\u00e8nes 23.5.2015
\nLA SITUATION JUDICIAIRE EN ITALIE.
\nSince taking up office, the new Prime Minister has announced \u201cepoch – making reforms\u201d to increase
\nthe quality and efficiency of justice.
\nPublicized as a \u00ab watershed \u00bb between the past and the future of the Judiciary, two reforms
\nconcerning the judges\u2019 and prosecutors\u2019 status have been recently approved.
\nThe slogan on the government website announced the first reform, adopted to reduce the days off
\n( Act 162\/2014): \u201c less days off for magistrates: civil justice more efficient\u201d.
\nLast February, the law on compensation for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions and
\nthe civil liability of judges and prosecutors was significantly changed ( Act 18\/2015).
\nActions for damages are no longer subject to a “recognition of admissibility” to be granted by the
\nCourt upon verification “prima facie” of existence of all pre-requisites for the suit (e.g the
\ninapplicability of any remedy such as appeal or complaints), even though the Italian Constitutional
\nCourt (judgment no. 468 of 1990), had qualified the \u201cfilter\u201d as an indispensable tool to avoid civil
\nliability being used to destabilising judges responsible for a case or to either directly or indirectly
\nattack their independence.
\nThe reform raises the threshold of economic compensation for the damage, which can be up to half
\nthe salary of the judge.
\nJudges\u2019 liability is still \u00ab indirect \u00bb and precluded in relation to the interpretation of provisions of law
\nand assessment of facts and of the evidence. Nevertheless, the “misrepresentation of the facts and
\nevidence\u201d and the \u201cmanifest infringement of law\u201d ( instead of the \u201cserious breach of law resulting
\nfrom gross negligence\u201d, ) are provided as new cases of liability. These provisions directly involve the
\njudges\u2019 activity of evaluation and interpretation, that is the essence of judicial activity: courts, facing
\ndivergent or conflicting arguments, must normally interpret the relevant legal rules in order to
\nresolve the dispute brought before them, and in almost all appeals to the Supreme Court parties
\ncontest the “misrepresentation\u201d of facts or \u201cmisinterpretation\u201d of law.
\nThe reform was carried out \u00ab in the name of Europe \u00bb. Actually, the EU Court of Justice , in 2006
\n( Case C-173\/03) and in 2011 ( C -379\/10) ruled that the exclusion of State liability, or the limitation
\nof State liability to cases of intentional fault or gross negligence, was contrary to the general principle
\nthat Member States are liable for an infringement of EU law by a court whose decision is not open to
\nappeal.
\nPublic statements by institutions representatives emphasized that the new law will \u00ab finally \u00bb make
\njudges and prosecutors liable, to embody the idea of a reform against the \u00ab privileges \u00bb of
\n\u00ab magistrates\u2019 caste \u00bb, and new provisions to protect citizens, making \u00ab justice less injust \u00bb.
\nThe National Association of Magistrates expressed its concerns and critical opinions: as many
\ncommentators have pointed out, the reform could lead to a \u00ab defensive \u00bb jurisprudence, avoiding
\nany innovative interpretative effort to protect rights ; the abolition of \u00ab filter \u00bb could turn out to be a
\ndangerous tool to get rid of an \u00ab uncomfortable \u00bb judge and condition his conduct during the
\nproceedings.
\n-Last April, the European Court of Human Rights \u2013 section IV (case Cestaro v. Italy – application no.
\n688\/11), ruling on the actions of Italian police officers in Genoa at the end of the G8 summit in July
\n2001, held that there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or
\ndegrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights on account of ill-treatment
\nsustained by the applicant when the police stormed the Diaz-Pertini school. According to the ECHR
\njudgment, there had been a further violation of article 3 because of the Italian criminal legislation
\nconcerning the punishment of acts of torture which – despite the obligations resulting from the UN
\nConvention against the torture, ratified in 1989- is still an ineffective deterrent to prevent the
\nrepetition of such acts.
\nThe events occurred during the G8 summit in Genoa represent one of the most painful moments of
\nthe recent history of the Italian Republic.
\nThe ECHR judgement has reminded public powers and institutions of their own responsibilities. The
\nCourt noted that the failure to identify the actual perpetrators of the ill-treatment could not be
\nimputed to the shortcomings or negligence of the public prosecutor\u2019s office, but to a lack of police
\ncooperation. On the other hand, the Court observed that the criminal proceedings had not led to any
\nconvictions for the ill-treatment of the applicant, in particular, as the physical injury offences were
\ntime-barred, but underlined that the Italian courts have shown an \u201cexemplary firmness\u201d (\u201cune
\nfermet\u00e9 exemplaire \u201c), rightly appreciating the extraordinary seriousness of the facts.
\nWhat we need, in Italy as in Europe, is a judiciary system capable of responding with \u201cexemplary
\nfirmness\u201d to every violation of rights. A system that can reaffirm the principles of equality and
\nsolidarity compromised by social and economic crisis, and that guarantees the effectiveness of the
\n\u201cinviolable\u201d rights enshrined in our Constitution and in the Charter of fundamental rights of EU: first
\nof all, the right of a free and dignified existence for all men and women who risk their life every day
\nin our seas to flee from tragedies in their countries.
\nJustice must be able to respond to these expectations of rights and solidarity. The inefficiency of our
\nsystem, caused by the lack of resources and structural reforms, makes more and more difficult to
\naccomplish this task.
\nLast April, in the Milan Court, a judge, a lawyer , and a citizen, were killed, as it had happened a few
\ndays before in the Istanbul Court, where the Prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz was killed.
\nThese tragic events, signs of increasing tension towards justice, should be a warning, to remind us
\nthat the Courts must continue to be and to represent places where rights are protected and where
\n\u201cJustice shields the man who fights for her\u201d 5.
\nLA SITUATION JUDICIAIRE EN POLOGNE
\nIn January, 2014 The Supreme Court, as a full court (four chambers, more than 80 judges) issued a
\nresolution stating, that the judge may be transferred from court to court only by the Minister of
\nJustice. This decision can not be taken by the Secretary of State or Sub-Secretary of State
\n(traditionally called deputy ministers). So the Supreme Court agreed with several hundred Polish
\njudges, who have been transferred to other courts by the deputy ministers of justice. For a period
\nabout three months they refused to judge in the new courts, stating that they are not authorised to
\ndo it, because they were transferred against the law. The dispute was began by the answer of
\nSupreme Court for the law question in the ordinary case (3 judges), expressing this same view. Due
\nto the open conflict of judges with the Minister of Justice Marek Biernacki, who along with officials of
\nthe Ministry would force judges to rule against their conviction, the issue was referred to the
\ndecision by the full Supreme Court bench. The decision about this way was taken by the First (Main)
\nPresident of the Supreme Court Stanislaw Dabrowski, who died just a few days before the release of
\nthis resolution.
\n5 Aeschylus, The Suppliants.
\nAfter the resolution the Supreme Court decided, that this interpretation is valid from the date of the
\nresolution; the different view could make invalid hundreds of thousands of decisions taken by 550
\nimproperly transferred judges for a period of about a year. The judges returned this time to service.
\nThe response of the Ministry of Justice was the intensification of the supervision over judges, and the
\nintroduction of systems having recorded any action taken by the judge in each case, to control the
\nactivities of judges by their superiors and officials of the Ministry. The actions of judges shall be
\nrecorded in computer systems by court clerks. Moreover, in the ministry began the work on another
\nchange of the law of common courts. This change shall to pick up the rest of allowances of bodies
\ndating from the democratic choices (made by the judges) and to delegate all decisions to the
\npresidents of courts, appointed by the Minister. It was such another change in the period of last 10
\nyears, during which time the judge’s government in Poland has lost almost all powers od selfgoverment.
\nThe opinions of the National Judiciary Council or judges, including the “Iustitia”, were
\nrejected by the minister. The minister did not lead any interviews with the judges.
\nIn the spring of 2014, Minister Marek Biernacki was dismissed and he was replaced by Cezary
\nGrabarczyk, one of the leaders of the ruling party (PO – Citizen Platform, the party of the new UE
\nPresident Donald Tusk), professional advocate. He cancelled developed by the predecessor
\ndangerous draft law ordering obligatory publication in the internet the assets declarations of the
\njudges (anti-corruption). It would expose judges to danger from criminals, because it revealed their
\nplace of residence and pointed owned assets. Minister Cezary Grabarczyk also announced the
\nreappointment of the courts, liquidated from 1 January 2013. by then Justice Minister Jaroslaw
\nGowin (non-lawyer) against the negative opinions of lawyers of all specialties. The number of
\nliquidated courts was 79. 34 of them have been newly created from 1 January 2015., from 1 July
\n2015 will be created another 41, about one court the dispute is continuing, and the last three courts
\nonly were really too small and their liquidation was not questioned.
\nMinister Cezary Grabarczyk would continue the work on changes of the law of common courts,
\nplanned by Marek Biernacki. In this law was a very dangerous change, giving the Minister of Justice
\nthe right to require at any time the file of every court case (also in progress) and control it. The
\nminister`s project also gave him the right of inspection of all the documents in the court computer
\nnetworks, including the testimony of all the witnesses and all the statements by the participants of
\ncase. This rules were written in the ministry, but from the project were it deleted, and later were it
\ngiven to one of the MPs from the ruling party with the order to propose this change as a proposal of
\nthe MP. In this way, the Minister avoided consulting the draft law with the National Judiciary Council
\nand judges from “Iustitia”.
\nThe law was a project of the government, so it was accepted, because all government projects are in
\nPolish parliament accepted (the MPs receive from the party leaders the commands, how to vote). In
\ncontrast, the President od Poland has not signed this bill and sent it to the Constitutional Court.
\nHowever, he found unconstitutional only the provisions giving the Minister of Justice access to
\nwitness statements and documents in the case, which violate the principle of protection people’s
\nprivacy and exposes them to disclosure sensitive data. The issue of strict subordination of judges to
\nsuperiors and limiting the judgement independence not interested in the president.
\nMoreover, in 2014 parliament reduced to 80 % of the remuneration of judges for the period of their
\nillness. The right to 100 % of salary for the period of illness MPs left now for themselves only (the
\njudges had this right more then 25 years).
\nOverall, the situation of the judiciary in Poland continues to deteriorate due to ongoing continuously
\nsince 2005. ever closer subordination the judificature of executive power.
\nPresident of \u201eIustitia\u201d, PJA
\nMaciej Str\u0105czy\u0144ski
\nLA SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE AU PORTUGAL
\nHaving been under a financial assistance programme negotiated with the European Union, the
\nEuropean Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund from May 2011 to May 2014, the
\njudicial system has suffered some of the effects of it, either from austerity measures imposed or
\nfrom reforms agreed by the Portuguese government with the so-called Troika.
\n1. The underfunding of the judicial system
\nDue to budgetary restrictions that were implemented in all the sectors of public administration, the
\nunderfunding of the judiciary \u2013 that has been a constant problem for decades \u2013 has increased in a
\ndramatic way. There is a serious lack of court clerks that compromises seriously the response of the
\njudicial system, mainly in areas like the enforcement of civil condemnations. This is a problem
\nrecognized by government officials but the solution is constantly being postponed, with the excuse of
\nthe lack of means to hire more clerks.
\n2. The cuts in salaries of judges and prosecutors and the non-existing progression in careers
\nImplemented since 2011, the cuts in salaries of judges and prosecutors (that were around 20% to
\n25%, higher than cuts of other public servants) remains in place and has only been softened by an
\nincrease in the payment level for some of the youngest judges and prosecutors that was put into
\nforce when the new organization of the judicial system was approved, in September 2014. Salaries
\nwere cut and the tax burden increased dramatically, leaving many magistrates in a very delicate
\nsituation. This, added to the fact that all progression in career has been almost completely frozen
\nsince mid-2006, leads to a huge decrease in the economic condition of all magistrates, seriously
\nthreatening not only the quality, but also the independence of the judiciary, as it was imposed
\nunilaterally by the legislative and executive powers.
\n3. New laws and new judicial organization
\nSome reforms intended to bring more effectiveness to the judicial system have been approved by the
\ngovernment and parliament. In September 2013, a new Civil Procedure Code entered into force,
\naiming to reduce formality in the procedure and this year a new Administrative Procedure Code was
\napproved and entered into force. The reform that was presented as the more radical was the
\nchanging of the organization of the judiciary that came to light in September 2014. The former
\ndivision of the country in more than 300 districts gave place to only 23 districts with a larger area of
\njurisdiction. Specialization was spread to the whole country, with labour, civil, criminal, family,
\ncommerce and intellectual property cases attributed to different and specialized courts. Each of the
\nnew 23 districts has its own president, appointed by the Superior Council, with administrative
\nfunctions set to improve efficiency. The system is still in the beginning and evaluation of the first
\nresults, but its implementation revealed the serious lack of resources of the judicial system. The
\ncomputer system wasn\u2019t ready for the overload that was necessary during the implementation and it
\nbroke down \u2013 courts were in most parts of Portugal almost completely inactive for almost two
\nmonths.
\n4. The independence of the judiciary \u2013 the proposed new statutes of judges and prosecutors
\nDuring the last year, workgroups composed of judges, members of judges and prosecutors
\nassociations, representatives of the government and judges and prosecutors appointed by the High
\nCouncils of Judges and Prosecutors have elaborated drafts of new statutes for judges and
\nprosecutors. They were presented in the beginning of the year to the Minister of Justice and approval
\nby the Council of Ministers is pending, for them to be presented to the Parliament to be approved
\nunder the form of law. They are aimed to establish more guarantees of independence and dignity to
\nJudges and Prosecutors, not only in the remuneration aspects, but mainly by putting into force rules
\nfor safeguarding unilateral changes in the statutes by the legislative and executive powers \u2013 the need
\nfor a qualified majority of 2\/3 of the members of parliament is established in order to prevent
\nchanges made in the statutes by one single party.
\nLegislative elections will take place in Portugal in September\/October, so the Parliament will only
\nremain in function until the end of July. The Minister of Justice has guaranteed that she will take the
\nprojects to Parliament in time for approval before the elections, but time is running out and until
\ntoday there are no signs that the approval of the projects by the Council of Ministers will be made
\nsoon.
\nAssocia\u00e7\u00e3o Sindical dos Ju\u00edzes Portugueses
\nMay 2015
\nLA SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN ROUMANIE
\n1. The legal system modifications.
\nThe Civil Code, the Civil Procedure Code, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code entered
\ninto force without simultaneously reform of the judiciary and legal system. There are still provisions
\nuncorrelated with the provisions of the new codes likely to create serious problems in solving the
\ncases. Also the lack of personnel and facilities within courts, makes, in some respects, impossible the
\nimplementation of the new codes. The system is underfinanced and there is no political will to
\nchange that.
\nThe Civil Procedure Code entered into force on 15 February 2013, and although it has been more
\nthan two years from this date, there are still provisions that cannot be implemented because in
\ncourts does not exist the necessary facilities. In this respect we recall the provisions relating to
\nhearing cases in \u201ccouncil chamber\u201d, whose entry into force was initially postponed until 2016, and
\nnow, apparently, the provisions will be further delayed, due to the lack of necessary spaces in courts.
\nAlthough the entry into force of the new Civil Procedure Code was intended to shorten the
\nsettlement of cases it is found that the effect is contrary. The new code involves an extensive
\nadministrative procedure and the lack of a sufficient number of clerks \/ administrative staff, properly
\ntrained, which could take over some of the administrative duties of the judges has a negative
\ninfluence on the duration of settlement process.
\nThe new Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes came into force in 2014 and their immediate
\napplication generated a non-unitary practice given the fundamental changes brought to the main
\nintuitions as well as the legislative incoherence.
\nThe mechanism created for the practice unification \u2013 a preliminary ruling by the High Court of
\nCassation and Justice \u2013 was not sufficient for removing this shortcoming, because this procedure is
\nnot governed by celerity and the High Court rules only on the merits leaving some important
\nprocedural aspects to be dealt differently by courts.
\nRegarding the new criminal codes it is important to state that there is a vast jurisprudence of the
\nConstitutional Court by which many provisions of the criminal code and especially the Criminal
\nProcedure Code have been declared unconstitutional.
\n2. The independence of the judiciary.
\nThe activity of the prosecutors intensified lately, especially in terms of fighting corruption
\nbut, in the stage of criminal prosecution (the non-public phase of the criminal process) a lot of
\nimportant information from the investigated cases reached the press. Important details of criminal
\ncases are therefore debated in the media before reaching the judges’ table.
\nThe entrance in force of the new criminal codes led to an avalanche of arrests and
\nregistration of new criminal cases on the basis of the denunciations made by persons deprived of
\ntheir liberty, because the new provisions established, initially, that the denounce is a cause of
\nimpunity. The demands for the arrest warrants and the denunciations were made public and
\ngenerated a debate likely to prejudice the image of justice.
\nThe image of justice was affected by the publication of the National Anticorruption Directorates
\nactivity report on 2014 in which, in Annex 3 – Presentation of the final acquittals in 2014 – is analyzed
\nthe content of the judgments of acquittal and are made assessments on compliance of these
\ndecisions with the administrated evidence or even with the law.
\nAlthough informed by the professional associations of judges, regarding the analyses made
\nby the DNA in the activity report, the Superior Council of the Magistracy had no reaction. The Plenary
\nof the SCM sent the complaints to one of its commissions, and, after discussions, the Commission
\ntook note that DNA has assumed the comments made by associations and appreciated that in the
\npublic space should not to be expressed criticism regarding the legality or the merits of the final
\njudicial decisions.
\nAlso, lately, the former Romanian president, repeatedly, stated that among magistrates are
\nunder covered agents. On the same theme the director of the Legal Division of the Romanian
\nInformation Service said that the courts have become the \u201ctactical fields\u201d for the intelligence
\noperations.
\nAccording to the legal frame of the judiciary the judges and prosecutors have the obligation
\nto make an annual affidavit, under the penalty of perjury within the meaning that they are not
\noperative workers, including undercover, informants or collaborators of the secret services,
\nstatements that should be checked by Supreme Council of National Defense. So far there is no
\nevidence showing that such checks were made and which was their result. In these conditions the
\nlaw is applied strictly in a formal manner and the consequences are reflected on the entire judiciary,
\nthrough the erosion of citizen confidence in an independent and impartial act of justice.
\nJudge Natalia Roman
\nPresident of the National Union of Judges in Romania
\nLA SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN SERBIE
\nSerbian judicial system has been deeply destabilized in 2009\/2010. In December 2009, more than 1\/3
\nmagistrates (more than 830 judges and 220 prosecutors) had been dismissed without transparent
\nand contradictory procedure and without any reason. As from 2010 the organization of the judiciary
\n(seats and territorial jurisdictions of courts and public prosecutor’s offices) was changed (the number
\nof basic courts was reduced from 138 to 34).
\n1. Permanent reform activities \u2013 destabilization of system
\nTill the end of 2012 all of dismissed magistrates who wanted it, have been reinstated (630 judges and
\nmore than 100 prosecutors). As from the 2014 the number of basic courts increased to 66.
\nSeveral dozens of laws have been changed (on organization of the judiciary, on courts\u2019 jurisdiction;
\non procedures \u2013 civil, criminal; numerous substantive laws) \u2013 for example, up till now, Law on Judges
\n(2008) has been amended 10 times, Law on Organisation of Courts (2008) – 6 times, Civil Procedure
\nCode (2011) – 4 times, Law on Enforcement ( 2011) \u2013 4 times, and the new one is in the
\nparliamentary procedure for adoption, Law on privatization (2001) 11 times (3 times in 2014), while
\nthe new one was passed in 2014; Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings (2004) was amended in 2005, and
\nreplaced by the new one in 2009, which was later on amended 3 times; Law on Restructuring,
\nBankruptcy and Liquidation of Banks (1990) 6 times, later (2005) replaced by new one, which was
\namended 2 times. Criminal Code (2005) was corrected and amended in that very year, and amended
\n7 times. Criminal Procedure Code (2001) was amended 9 times until 2010; second Criminal
\nProcedure Code (2006) although it has never been enforced, was amended in 2007 and 2008, and
\nthe actual Criminal Procedure Code (2011) had been amended even before its implementation began
\n(in 2011) and has been amended 5 times.
\nThe 2013\/2018 National judicial reform strategy was adopted. Serbia is in the process of the
\nnegotiations for the EU accession and in process of drafting Chapter 23 Action Plan. All that demands
\nthe harmonization of the laws with EU legal system.
\nThe reform\u2019s measures of judicial system that has been undertaken so far were not adequate for
\nsolving the problem they addressed to and failed to fully stabilize the system. The planned activities
\n(time frames, priorities, articulations of the activities) do not fully meet the solutions.
\n2. Failure in functioning of High Judicial Council
\nDuring past years High Judicial Council failed in its role both as safeguard of the independence of
\njudges and courts and as manager of the judicial system and enabled executives to put huge
\ninfluence at its functioning.
\n3. Evaluation of judges work – based \u201ccult of statistics\u201d
\nThe evaluation is not yet in function (the beginning of the evaluation is foreseen for 1.7.2015); the
\nbylaw on evaluation is based \u201ccult of statistics\u201d, quantity and rapidity which decreases the quality of
\nthe judges \u2018work.
\n4. Unequal burdening of judges and courts – Unequal access to justice
\nThe judges, especially in civil cases, are over burdened. For example:
\nnumber of civil and commercial litigious cases per 100.000 inhabitants in 2012
\nstate
\nnumber of cases
\nat the beggining
\nof 2012.
\n2012.
\nin flow
\nnumber of
\nresolved cases in
\n2012.
\nclearance rate
\nSerbia 2.990 3.214 3.727 116%
\nAustria 468 1.235 1.242 100,6%
\nCzech Republik 1.590 3.457 3.415 98,8%
\nFrance 2.143 2.575 2.555 99,2%
\nGermany 995 1.961 1.968 100,4%
\nPoland 993 2.771 2.451 88,5%
\nWorkload of judges differs from court to court. In some basic courts, there are 400-500 criminal
\ncases per one judge, and in some other courts one judge has 100 cases or less; the similar situation is
\nwith civil litigious cases. In some higher courts, in second instance, one judge deals with 700-1200
\ncases, and in other of such courts with 100-15 cases.
\nSuch situation causes resolving of the similar cases in different timeframe depending on workload of
\njudge and results in unequal access of citizens to justice, depending of the cities they are living in.
\n5. Continuous training needed
\nLack of continuous training of judges, together with frequent changes of laws and reduced
\njurisdiction of the Supreme court of cassation, causes unharmonised case law.
\n6. Cuts of judges salaries for 10%
\nThe salary of the judge of the basic court is less than 800 Euros, and judge of appellate court around
\n1000 Euros (average salary in Serbia is 350 Euros).
\n7. Problems with judges from Kosovo and Metohija
\nIn order to fully implement 2013 Brussels agreement, judges of the Republic of Serbia are invited to
\napply for the posts in the judicial system other then Serbian (of Kosovo) \u2013 which jeopardize their
\nSerbian citizenship, permanency of their tenure, their personal security due the fact that the
\nsafeguard of no transferability of judges does not exist in Kosovo, as well as their social insurance (no
\npension higher of 90 Euro in Kosovo).
\nLA SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE
\nThe Judiciary of the Czech Republic is set out in Constitution, which defines courts as
\nindependent institutions within the traditional framework of checks and balances. The whole of
\nChapter Four of the Constitution of the Czech Republic is dedicated to defining the role of the judicial
\npower in the Czech Republic. The basic regulation of the judicial function is provided by Act no.
\n6\/2002 Coll., Courts, Judges, Lay-judges and the State Administration of Courts Act (the Judges Act
\n2002).
\nThere are three distinct jurisdictions: courts of general jurisdiction, administrative courts and
\nthe Constitutional Court. The two latter are specialised jurisdictions \u2013 their competence must be
\nexpressly provided for in law. If no such provision exists, the matter will be dealt with by the courts of
\ngeneral jurisdiction (civil courts). The majority of higher courts are seated in Brno, so as to provide a
\ncounterbalance to the concentration of power in the capital (Prague).
\nThere is no trial by jury. There is, however, the laic participation in the administration of
\njustice in the form of laypersons sitting as judges in chambers, hearing cases first hand. Laypersons
\nare elected by local councils. Two lay judges sit with a professional judge, hearing non-specialised
\ncases first hand. Appellate and Supreme courts\u00b4 chambers are composed of professional judges only.
\nThe Czech Republic has a system of career judiciary; this system has, however, been modified
\nby the requirement of 30 years of age for new judges. The candidates are chosen in the previously
\nadvertised competition. The judges are appointed by the President of the Republic and normally may
\nnot be recalled or transferred without their will. Judges are appointed for life and can be only
\nremoved following disciplinary proceedings conducted by The Supreme Administrative Court
\n(disciplinary chambres). There is one instance disciplinary proceeding.
\nThe state administration of courts has repeatedly been criticised on international as well as
\ndomestic forum. The Ministry of Justice administers the high courts, regional courts and district
\ncourts within the scope of Act No 6\/2002, either directly or through the Presidents of the courts; the
\ndistrict courts may also be administered by the Ministry of Justice through the Presidents of the
\nregional courts. The state administration of the courts involves such crucial elements as the courts\u00b4
\nbudgeting or the appointment of presidents and vice-presidents of the courts.
\nThe selection process, appointment of judges and their promotion to the higher courts have
\nbeen widely discussed over the years. A solution, that would fit best, seems to be the
\nimplementation of a Supreme Judicial Council as a body with competence in the processes described
\nabove. The creation of such a body is a topical and continuous point of discussion between the
\ngovernment and the representatives of the judiciary in the Czech Republic.
\nCzech Union of Judges
\nSITUATION EN JUSTICE TURQUIE
\n05.05.2015
\nMain problem of Turkey is the fact that executive and legislative power has been
\naccumulated in the hands of Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan (President). Wielding unchecked and unbalanced
\nlegislative and executive power, he has become more authoritarian and he has created \u201cone-man
\nrule\u201d in Turkey through repressive laws enacted while he was prime minister. All state bodies and
\nsupervisory institutions rendered unfunctional including judiciary.
\nIncumbent party reshaped the whole judiciary in a year and a half after major corruption
\ninvestigations revealed.
\nJudiciary is controlled by High Council of Judges and Prosecutors in Turkey, membership
\nelection of which was held on October 2014 and government backed list won 15 seats total out of 22
\nthus government in direct control of it.
\nAfter HCJP members selected, government enacted new legislation added eight new
\nchambers to the Supreme Court of Appeals and two new chambers to the Council of State.
\nConsequently newly designed High Judicial Council assigned 144 new members to the Supreme Court
\nof Appeals and 39 members to the Council of State. Now both the local courts and the higher
\njudiciary are being subordinated to the government. The government established tutelage over the
\njudiciary by assigning many pro-government jurists to newly created chambers in top judicial bodies.
\nGovernment now uses HCJP to steer any case towards desired direction by, for example
\nreassigning local judges and prosecutors to other positions so as to change the outcome of an
\nimportant case.
\nIn 2014, government changed Turkish Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to create
\nits own special criminal judicial system which is being used against all dissidents to silence them. This
\nnew courts and criminal procedure code allow government to apply pre-trial detention and arrest
\nmeasures arbitrarily which are used as a punishment tool for all dissidents, opponents and critics.
\nNewly created \u201cPenal Magistracy of Peace\u201d and \u201cSpecially Authorized High Criminal Courts
\nfor Crimes against Constitutional Order\u201d are pro-arrest and prone to become government tool to
\nsilence dissidents,
\nThese special courts have extensive powers to take all decisions related to the conduct of
\ncriminal investigations, such as detention, arrest, release and seizure of property. There is a closedcircuit
\nsystem in appeal process contrary to fair trial principles.
\nPresently corruption investigations are dropped, prosecutors who dealt with these
\ninvestigations are referred to newly elected HCJP to be barred from profession and at the same time
\nthey put on trial for investigating corruption facing jail sentences for years.
\nGraver than all these, on 30 April 2015, two judge were arrested by a High Criminal Court
\nbecause of release orders that they issued. In modern Turkish State history this is the first time
\njudges are arrested because of their judgment and for professional judicial activity.
\nPreviously judges and prosecutors were intimidated by measures such as removal,
\nrelocation, demotion or disciplinary actions. Now detention and arrest are used against judges or
\nprosecutors who deal with crucial cases.
\nDozens of people, including journalists, activists and even high school students, have been
\nprosecuted on the basis of insulting the President. Penal Magistracy Courts ban Twitter accounts and
\nremove tweets posted by dozens of users. Journalists are sued even for writing tweets that are
\ncritical of President or the government.
\nMurat Durmaz
\nAdministrative Judge
\nYARSAV Board Member Responsible for International Relations<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
SITUATION DE LA JUSTICE EN ALLEMAGNE 1. La R\u00e9publique F\u00e9d\u00e9rale Allemande se comprend comme un \u00e9tat de droit d\u00e9mocratique et social (Art. 20 de la constitution, Grundgesetz (GG), Loi Fondamentale). L\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la justice, aux juges, auxquels le pouvoir de rendre la justice est confi\u00e9e (Art. 92), est garanti par la constitution (Art. 19 alin\u00e9a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3714,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[48],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3944","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"yoast_head":"\n